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Abstract We show that forms of Bayesian and MDL inference that are often applied to
classification problems can be inconsistent. This means that there exists a learning prob-
lem such that for all amounts of data the generalization errors of the MDL classifier and
the Bayes classifier relative to the Bayesian posterior both remain bounded away from the
smallest achievable generalization error. From a Bayesian point of view, the result can be
reinterpreted as saying that Bayesian inference can be inconsistent under misspecification,
even for countably infinite models. We extensively discuss the result from both a Bayesian
and an MDL perspective.
Keywords Bayesian statistics . Minimum description length . Classification . Consistency .
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1 Introduction
Overfitting is a central concern of machine learning and statistics. Two frequently used
learning methods that in many cases ‘automatically’ protect against overfitting are Bayesian
inference (Bernardo & Smith, 1994) and the Minimum Description Length (MDL) Principle
(Rissanen, 1989; Barron, Rissanen, & Yu, 1998; Gru¨nwald, 2005, 2007). We show that, when
applied to classification problems, some of the standard variations of these two methods can
be inconsistent in the sense that they asymptotically overfit: there exist scenarios where, no
matter how much data is available, the generalization error of a classifier based on MDL
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or the full Bayesian posterior does not converge to the minimum achievable generalization
error within the set of classifiers under consideration.
This result may be viewed as a challenge to Bayesian inference. Given a powerful piece of
information (an objectively correct “prior” on a set of classifiers), transforming this informa-
tion into a Bayesian prior on a set of distributions in a straightforward manner and applying
Bayes rule yields significantly suboptimal behavior—while another simple approach yields
optimal behavior. The key is the transformation from classifiers (functions mapping each
input X to a discrete class label Y ) to (conditional) distributions. Such a transformation is
necessary because Bayes rule cannot be directly applied to classifiers. We do the conversion
in a straightforward manner, crossing a prior on classifiers with a prior on error rates for
these classifiers. This conversion method is a completely standard tool for Bayesians active
in the field of machine learning—we tested this with some professing Bayesians, see Sec-
tion 6.3.4—yet it inevitably leads to (sometimes subtly) ‘misspecified’ probability models not
containing the ‘true’ distribution D. The result may therefore be re-interpreted as ‘Bayesian
inference can be inconsistent under misspecification for common classification probability
models’. Since, in practice, Bayesian inference for classification tasks is frequently and in-
evitably based on misspecified probability models, the result remains relevant even if (as
many Bayesians do, especially those not active in the field of machine learning) one insists
that inference starts directly with a probability model, rather than a classification model that
is then transformed into a probability model—see Section 6.
There are two possible resolutions to this challenge. Perhaps Bayesian inference is an
incomplete characterization of learning: there exist pieces of information (e.g. prior infor-
mation on deterministic classifiers rather than distributions) which can not be well integrated
into a prior distribution and so learning algorithms other than Bayesian inference are some-
times necessary. Or, perhaps there is some less naive method allowing a prior to express the
available information. We discuss this issue further in Section 6.
1.1 A preview
1.1.1 Classification problems
A classification problem is defined on an input (or feature) domain X and output domain (or
class label) Y = {0, 1}. The problem is defined by a probability distribution D over X × Y .
A classifier is a function c : X → Y . The error rate of any classifier is quantified as:
eD(c) = E(x,y)∼D I (c(x) = y)
where (x, y) ∼ D denotes a draw from the distribution D and I (·) is the indicator function
which is 1 when its argument is true and 0 otherwise.
The goal is to find a classifier which, as often as possible according to D, correctly
predicts the class label given the input feature. Typically, the classification problem is solved
by searching for some classifier c in a limited subset C of all classifiers using a sample
S = (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym) ∼ Dm generated by m independent draws from the distribution
D. Naturally, this search is guided by the empirical error rate. This is the error rate on the
subset S defined by:
eˆS(c) := E(x,y)∼S I (c(x) = y) = 1|S|
∑
(x,y)∈S
I (c(x) = y).
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where (x, y) ∼ S denotes a sample drawn from the uniform distribution on S. Note that
eˆS(c) is a random variable dependent on a draw from Dm . In contrast, eD(c) is a number (an
expectation) relative to D.
1.1.2 The basic result
The basic result is that certain classifier learning algorithms may not behave well as a func-
tion of the information they use, even when given infinitely many samples to learn from.
The learning algorithms we analyze are “Bayesian classification” (Bayes), “Maximum a
Posteriori classification” (MAP), “Minimum Description Length classification” (MDL) and
“Occam’s Razor Bound classification” (ORB). These algorithms are precisely defined later.
Functionally they take as arguments a training sample S and a “prior” P which is a probabil-
ity distribution over a set of classifiers C. The result applies even when the process creating
classification problems draws the optimal classifier from P(c). In Section 3 we state the basic
result, Theorem 2. The theorem has the following corollary, indicating suboptimal behavior
of Bayes and MDL:
Corollary 1 (Classification Inconsistency). There exists an input domainX and a prior P(c)
on a countable set of classifiers C such that:
1. (inconsistency according to true distribution). There exists a learning problem (distribu-
tion) D such that the Bayesian classifier cBAYES(P,S), the MAP classifier cMAP(P,S), and the
MDL classifier cMDL(P,S) are asymptotically suboptimal with respect to the ORB classifier
cORB(P,S). That is, for c∗ ∈ {cBAYES(P,S), cMAP(P,S), cMDL(P,S)},
lim
m→∞ PrS∼Dm(eD(cORB(P,S)) + 0.05 < eD(c
∗)) = 1. (1)
2. (inconsistency according to prior). There exists a randomized algorithm selecting learning
problems D in such a way that
– (a) the prior P(c) is ‘objectively correct’ in the sense that, for all c ∈ C, with probability
P(c), c is the optimal classifier, achieving minc∈C eD(c).
– (b) (1) holds no matter what learning problem D/classifier c is selected. In particular, (1)
holds with prior probability 1.
How dramatic is this result? We may ask
1. Are the priors P for which the result holds natural?
2. How large can the suboptimality become and how small can eD(cORB(P,S)) be?
3. Does this matter for logarithmic loss (which is what MDL approaches seek to minimize
(Gru¨nwald, 2007)) rather than 0-1 loss?
4. Is cORB(P,S) an algorithm which contains information specific to the distribution D?
5. Is this theorem relevant at small (and in particular noninfinite) sample sizes?
We will ask a number of more detailed questions from a Bayesian perspective in Section 6
and from an MDL perspective in Section 7. The short answer to (1) and (2) is: the priors P
have to satisfy several requirements, but they correspond to priors often used in practice. The
size of the suboptimality can be quite large, at least for the MAP and MDL classifiers (the
number of 0.05 was just chosen for concreteness; other values are possible) and eD(cORB(P,S))
can be quite small—see Section 5.1 and Fig. 1. The short answer to (3) is “yes”. A similar
result holds for logarithmic loss, see Section 6.1.
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Fig. 1 A graph depicting the set
of asymptotically allowed error
rates for different classification
algorithms. The x-axis depicts the
optimal classifier’s error rate μ
(also shown as the straight line).
The lower curve is just 0.5H (μ)
and the upper curve is H (μ).
Theorem 2 says that any (μ, μ′)
between the straight line and the
lower curve can be achieved for
some learning problem D and
prior P . Theorem 3 shows that
the Bayesian learner can never
have asymptotic error rate μ′
above the upper curve
The answer to (4) is “no”. The algorithm cORB(P,S), which minimizes the Occam’s Razor
bound (ORB) (see (Blumer et al., 1987) or Section 4.2), is asymptotically consistent for any
D:
Theorem 1 (ORB consistency). For all priors P nonzero on a set of classifiers C, for all
learning problems D, and all constants K > 0 the ORB classifier cORB(P,S) is asymptotically
K -optimal:
lim
m→∞ PrS∼Dm
(
eD(cORB(P,S)) > K + inf
c∈C
eD(c)
)
= 0.
The answer to (5) is that the result is very relevant for small sample sizes because the
convergence to the probability 1 event occurs at a speed exponential in m. Although the
critical example uses a countably infinite set of classifiers, on a finite set of n classifiers,
the analysis implies that for m < log n, Bayesian inference gives poorer performance than
Occam’s Razor Bound optimization.
Overview of the Paper. The remainder of this paper first defines precisely what we mean by
the above classifiers. It then states the main inconsistency theorem which implies the above
corollary, as well as a theorem that provides an upper-bound on how badly Bayes can behave.
In Section 4 we prove the theorems. Technical discussion, including variations of the result,
are discussed in Section 5.1. A discussion of the result from a Bayesian point of view is given
in Section 6, and from an MDL point of view in Section 7.
2 Some classification algorithms
The basic inconsistency result is about particular classifier learning algorithms which we
define next.
2.1 The Bayesian classification algorithm
The Bayesian approach to inference starts with a prior probability distribution P over a set of
distributions P . P typically represents a measure of “belief” that some p ∈ P is the process
generating data. Bayes’ rule states that, given sample data S, the posterior probability P(· | S)
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that some p is the process generating the data is:
P(p | S) = p(S)P(p)
P(S) . (2)
where P(S) := E p∼P [p(S)] =
∑
p∈P P(p)p(S), the sum being replaced by an integral when
P is continuous and P admits a density. Note that in Bayesian statistics, p(S) is usually
denoted as P(S | p).
In classification problems with sample size m = |S|, each p ∈ P is a distribution on
(X × Y)m and the outcome S = (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym) is the sequence of labeled examples.
If we intend to perform classification based on a set of classifiers C rather than distributions
P , it is natural to introduce a “prior” P(c) that a particular classifier c : X → {0, 1} is the
best classifier for solving some learning problem. This, of course, is not a Bayesian prior in
the conventional sense because classifiers do not induce a measure over the training data. In
order to apply Bayesian inference, we somehow need to convert the set of classifiers into a
corresponding set of distributions P . With such a conversion, the prior P(c) will induce a
conventional Bayesian prior on P after all.
One common conversion (Jordan, 1995; Tipping, 2001; Gru¨nwald, 1998) transforms the
set of classifiers C into a simple logistic regression model—the precise relationship to logistic
regression is discussed in Section 5.2. In the special case considered in this paper, c(x) ∈ {0, 1}
is binary valued. Then (but only then) the conversion amounts to assuming that the error
rate θ of the optimal classifier is independent of the feature value x . This is known as
“homoskedasticity” in statistics and “label noise” in learning theory. More precisely, we let
P consist of the set of distributions pc,θ , where c ∈ C and θ ∈ [0, 1]. These are defined as
conditional probability distributions over the labels given the unlabeled data:
pc,θ (ym | xm) = θmeˆS (c)(1 − θ )m−meˆS (c). (3)
This expresses that there exists some θ such that ∀x Pc,θ (c(X ) = y | X = x) = θ . (ho-
moskedasticity). Note that
pc,θ (y|x) =
{
θ if c(x) = y
1 − θ if c(x) = y.
For each fixed θ < 0.5, the log likelihood log pc,θ (ym | xm) is linearly decreasing in the
empirical error that c makes on S. By differentiating with respect to θ , we see that for fixed
c, the likelihood (3) is maximized by setting θ := eˆS(c), giving
log
1
pc,eˆS (c)(ym | xm)
= m H (eˆS(c)), (4)
where H is the binary entropy H (μ) = μ log 1
μ
+ (1 − μ) log 11−μ , which is strictly increas-
ing for μ ∈ [0, 0.5). Here, as everywhere else in the paper, log stands for binary logarithm.
Thus, the conversion is “reasonable” in the sense that, both with fixed θ < 0.5 and with the
likelihood-maximizing θ = eˆS(c) which varies with the data, the likelihood is a decreasing
function in the empirical error rate of c, so that classifiers which achieve small error on the
data correspond to a large likelihood of the data.
We further assume that some distribution px on Xm generates the x-values, and, in par-
ticular that this distribution is independent of c and θ . With this assumption, we can apply
Bayes rule to get a posterior on pc,θ , denoted as P(c, θ | S), without knowing px , since the
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px (xm)-factors cancel:
P(c, θ | S) = pc,θ (y
m |xm)px (xm)P(c, θ )
P(ym | xm)px (xm) =
pc,θ (ym |xm)P(c, θ )
Ec,θ∼P [pc,θ (ym | xm)] . (5)
As is customary in Bayesian statistics, here as well as in the remainder of this paper we
defined the prior P over (c, θ ) rather than directly over pc,θ . The latter choice would be
equivalent but notationally more cumbersome.
To make (5) applicable, we need to specify a prior measure on the joint space C × [0, 1]
of classifiers and θ -parameters. In the next section we discuss the priors under which the
theorems hold.
Bayes rule (5) is formed into a classifier learning algorithm by choosing the most likely
label given the input x and the posterior P(·|S):
cBAYES(P,S)(x) :=
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
1 if Ec,θ∼P(·|S)[pc,θ (Y = 1|X = x)] > 12 ,
0 if Ec,θ∼P(·|S)[pc,θ (Y = 1|X = x)] < 12 .
(6)
If Ec,θ∼P(·|S)[pc,θ (Y = 1|X = x)] = 12 , then the value of cBAYES(P,S) is determined by an in-
dependent toss of a fair coin.
2.2 The MAP classification algorithm
The integrations of the full Bayesian classifier can be too computationally intensive, so in
practice one often predicts using the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) classifier. This classifier
is given by:
cMAP(P,S) = arg max
c∈C
max
θ∈[0,1]
P(c, θ | S) = arg max
c∈C
max
θ∈[0,1]
pc,θ (ym | xm)P(c, θ )
with ties broken arbitrarily. Integration over θ ∈ [0, 1] is easy compared to summation over
c ∈ C, so one sometimes uses a learning algorithm (SMP) which integrates over θ (like full
Bayes) but maximizes over c (like MAP):
cSMP(P,S) = arg max
c∈C
P(c | S) = arg max
c∈C
Eθ∼P(θ ) pc,θ (ym | xm)P(c |θ ).
2.3 The MDL classification algorithm
The MDL approach to classification is transplanted from the MDL approach to density
estimation. There is no such thing as a ‘definition’ of MDL for classification because the
transplant has been performed in various ways by various authors. Nonetheless, as we discuss
in Section 7, many implementations are essentially equivalent to the following algorithm
(Quinlan & Rivest, 1989; Rissanen, 1989; Kearns et al., 1997; Gru¨nwald, 1998):
cMDL(P,S) = arg min
c∈C
{
log
1
P(c) + log
(
m
meˆS(c)
)}
. (7)
The quantity minimized has a coding interpretation: it is the number of bits required to
describe the classifier plus the number of bits required to describe the labels on S given
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the classifier and the unlabeled data. We call—log P(c) + log( m
meˆS (c) ) the two-part MDL
codelength for encoding data S with classifier c.
3 Main theorems
We prove inconsistency for some countable set of classifiers C = {c0, c1, . . .} which we define
later. The inconsistency is attained for priors with ‘heavy tails’. Formally, for Theorem 2
(inconsistency of Bayes, MDL, MAP and SMP), we require P(ck) to be such that for all k,
log
1
P(ck)
≤ log k + o(log k). (8)
This condition is satisfied, for example, by Rissanen’s (1983) universal prior for the integers.
Another simple prior satisfying (8) can be defined as follows: group the classifiers c1, c2, . . .
as C0 := {c1}, C1 := {c2, c3}, C2 := {c4, . . . , c7} and so on, so that Ca contains 2a classifiers.
Then the prior of any classifier in Ca is defined as
P(c) = 1
a(a + 1) 2
−a .
The sensitivity of our results to the choice of prior is analyzed further in Section 5.1. The prior
on θ can be any distribution P on [0, 1] with a density w that is continuously differentiable
and bounded away from 0 on [0, 0.5), i.e. for some γ > 0,
for all θ ∈ [0, 0.5), w(θ ) > γ. (9)
For example, we may take the uniform distribution on [0, 1] with w(θ ) ≡ 1. We can also take
the uniform distribution on [0, 0.5), with w(θ ) ≡ 2.
For our result concerning the full Bayesian classifier, Theorem 2, Part (b), we need to
make the further restriction1
P(θ ≥ 0.5) = 0. (10)
For ease of comparison with other results (Section 6), we shall also allow discrete priors on
θ that put all their mass on a countable set, [0, 1] ∩ Q. For such priors, we require that they
satisfy, for all a ∈ N, all b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , a/2}:
P
(
θ = b
a
)
≥ K1a−K2 (11)
for some fixed constants K1, K2 > 0. An example of a prior achieving (11) is P(θ = b/a) =
1/(a(a + 1)a/2 + 1).
1 Without this restriction, we may put nonzero prior on distributions pc,θ with θ > 1/2. For such distributions,
the log likelihood of the data increases rather than decreases as a linear function of the error that c makes on
the data. This implies that with a uniform prior, under our definition of the Bayes MAP classifier, in some
cases the MAP classifier may be the classifier with the largest, rather than the smallest empirical error. As
pointed out by a referee, for this reason the term “Bayes MAP classifier” may be somewhat of a misnomer: it
does not always coincide with the Bayes act corresponding to the MAP distribution. If one insists on defining
the Bayes MAP classifier as the Bayes act corresponding to the MAP distribution, then one can achieve this
simply by restricting oneself to priors satisfying (10), since all our results still hold under the restriction (10).
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We assume that the priors P(θ ) on [0, 1] and the prior P(c) on C are fully dependent
so that every classifier can have its own error rate. We require each classifier to have the
same prior for θ . Thus, P(c, θ ) = P(c)P(θ |c) where for every c, P(θ |c) is set to P(θ ). Note
that given a sample S, the posterior P(θ |c, S) can depend on c. In the theorem, H (μ) =
μ log 1
μ
+ (1 − μ) log 11−μ stands for the binary entropy of a coin with bias μ. The function
g(μ) appearing in Part (b) of the theorem is defined as
g(μ) = μ + sup {ν |ν ≥ 0 ; H (ν) < H (μ) − 2μ}. (12)
This function will be analyzed later.
Theorem 2 (Classification inconsistency). There exists an input space X and a countable
set of classifiers C such that the following holds: let P be any prior satisfying (8) and (9).
Then, for all μ ∈ (0, 0.5),
(a) For all μ′ ∈ [μ, H (μ)/2), there exists a D with minc∈C eD(c) = eD(c0) = μ such that,
for all large m, with am = 3 exp(−2√m),
Pr
S∼Dm
(eD(cMAP(P,S)) = μ′) ≥ 1 − am
Pr
S∼Dm
(eD(cSMP(P,S)) = μ′) ≥ 1 − am
Pr
S∼Dm
(eD(cMDL(P,S)) = μ′) ≥ 1 − am . (13)
(b) If the prior P further satisfies (10), then for all μ′ ∈ [μ, g(μ)), there exists a D with
minc∈C eD(c) = eD(c0) = μ such that, for all large m, with am = (6 + o(1)) exp(−(1 −
2μ)√m),
Pr
S∼Dm
(eD(cBAYES(P,S)) ≥ μ′) ≥ 1 − am . (14)
Since H (μ)/2 > μ for all μ ∈ (0, 0.5) (Fig. 1), inconsistency of cMAP(P,S), cSMP(P,S) and
cMDL(P,S) can occur for all μ ∈ (0, 0.5). The theorem states that Bayes is inconsistent for
all large m on a fixed distribution D. This is a significantly more difficult statement than
“for all (large) m, there exists a learning problem where Bayes is inconsistent”.2 Differenti-
ation of 0.5H (μ) − μ shows that the maximum discrepancy between eD(cMAP(P,S)) and μ is
achieved for μ = 1/5. With this choice of μ, 0.5H (μ) − μ = 0.1609 . . . so that, by choosing
μ′ arbitrarily close to H (μ), the discrepancy μ′ − μ comes arbitrarily close to 0.1609 . . ..
These findings are summarized in Fig. 1. Concerning cBAYES(P,S), since H (μ) − 2μ > 0 for
all μ ∈ (0, 0.5), H (0) = 0 and H (ν) is monotonically increasing between 0 and 0.5, we
have g(μ) > μ for all μ ∈ (0, 0.5). Hence, inconsistency can occur for all such μ. Since
H (ν) is monotonically increasing in ν, the largest value of ν can be obtained for the μ
for which H (μ) − 2μ is largest. We already noted that this is maximized for μ = 0.2.
Then the largest ν such that H (ν) < H (μ) − 2μ = 2 · 0.1609... can be numerically cal-
culated as νmax = 0.0586.... Thus, in that case we can get eD(cBAYES(P,S)) arbitrarily close to
μ + νmax = 0.2586....3
2 In fact, a meta-argument can be made that any nontrivial learning algorithm is ‘inconsistent’ in this sense
for finite m.
3 While we have no formal proof, we strongly suspect that g(μ) can be replaced by H (μ)/2 in Part 2 of the
theorem, so that the suboptimality for cBAYES(P,S) would be just as large as for the other three classifiers. For
this reason we did not bother to draw the function g(μ) in Fig. 1.
Springer
Mach Learn
How large can the discrepancy between μ = infc eD(c) and μ′ = eD(cBAYES(P,S)) be in
the large m limit, for general learning problems? The next theorem, again summarized in
Fig. 1, gives an upper bound which holds for all learning problems (distributions D), namely,
μ′ < H (μ):
Theorem 3 (Maximal inconsistency of Bayes). Let Si be the sequence consisting of the first
i examples (x1, y1), . . . , (xi , yi ). For all priors P nonzero on a set of classifiers C, for all
learning problems D with 0 < infc∈C eD(c) = μ < 0.5, for all δ > 0, for all large m, with
Dm-probability ≥ 1 − 2 exp(−2√m),
1
m
m
∑
i=1
∣
∣yi − cBAYES(P,Si−1)(xi )
∣
∣ ≤ H (μ) + δ.
The theorem says that for large m, the total number of mistakes when successively classifying
yi given xi made by the Bayesian algorithm based on Si−1, divided by m, is not larger than
H (μ). By the law of large numbers, it follows that for large m, eD(cBAYES(P,Si−1)(xi )), averaged
over all i , is no larger than H (μ). Thus, it is not ruled out that sporadically, for some i ,
eD(cBAYES(P,Si−1)(xi )) > H (μ); but this must be ‘compensated’ for by most other i . We did
not find a proof that eD(cBAYES(P,Si−1)(xi )) ≤ H (μ) for all large i .
4 Proofs
4.1 Inconsistent learning algorithms: Proof of Theorem 2
Below we first define the particular learning problem that causes inconsistency. We then
analyze the performance of the algorithms on this learning problem.
4.1.1 The learning problem
For given μ and μ′ ≥ μ, we construct a learning problem and a set of classifiers C =
{c0, c1, . . .} such that c0 is the ‘good’ classifier with eD(c0) = μ and c1, c2, . . . are all ‘bad’
classifiers with eD(c j ) = μ′ ≥ μ. x = x0x1 . . . ∈ X = {0, 1}∞ consists of one binary fea-
ture per classifier, and the classifiers simply output the value of their special feature. The
underlying distribution D depends on two parameters 0 < ph < 1 and η ∈ [0, 1/2). These
are defined in terms of the μ and μ′ mentioned in the theorem, in a way to be described later.
To construct an example (x, y), we first flip a fair coin to determine y, so y = 1 with
probability 1/2. We then flip a coin with bias ph which determines if this is a “hard” example
or an “easy” example. Based upon these two coin flips, for j ≥ 1, each x j is independently
generated according to the following 2 cases.
1. For a “hard” example, and for each classifier c j with j ≥ 1, set x j = |1 − y| with probabil-
ity 1/2 and x j = y otherwise. Thus, x1, x2, . . . becomes an infinite sequence of realizations
of i.i.d. uniform Bernoulli random variables.
2. For an “easy” example, we flip a third coin Z with bias η. If Z = 0 (‘example ok’), we
set, for every j ≥ 1, x j = y. If Z = 1, we set, for all j ≥ 1, x j = |1 − y| otherwise. Note
that for an “easy” example, all bad classifiers make the same prediction.
The bad classifiers essentially predict Y by random guessing on hard examples. On easy
examples, they all make the same prediction, which is correct with probability 1 − η > 0.5.
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It remains to define the input x0 of the “good” classifier c0 with true error rate μ. This is done
simply by setting x0 = |1 − y| with probability μ and x0 = y otherwise.
The setting of ph and η is different for, on the one hand, the (S)MAP and MDL incon-
sistency proofs, and on the other hand, the full Bayes inconsistency proof. To get a first,
intuitive idea of the proof, it is best to ignore, for the time being, the parameter values for the
full Bayes proof.
In the MAP and MDL inconsistency proof, we set ph := 2μ′ and η = 0. In the Bayes
proof, we first set ph := 2μ. We then define ν := μ′ − μ and we set η := ν/(1 − 2μ). By
the conditions of the theorem, we have 0 < H (ν) < H (μ) − 2μ. Note that for such ν, H (ν) <
1 − 2μ and therefore 2ν ≤ 1 − 2μ so that η < 1/2. As is easily checked in the (S)MAP and
MDL case, and somewhat harder to check in the full Bayes case, the error rate of each ‘bad’
classifier is eD(c j ) = μ′ for all j ≥ 1.
Discussion The inputs x are infinite-dimensional vectors. Nevertheless, the Bayesian
posterior can be arbitrarily well approximated in finite time for any finite sample size m if we
order the features according to the prior of the associated classifier. We need only consider
features which have an associated prior greater than 12m since the minus log-likelihood of the
data is always less than m + O(log m) bits. This follows because by (9) and (11), the prior
P(θ ) puts sufficient mass in a neighborhood of θ = 0.5. For such θ , the distribution pc,θ (y|x)
becomes uniform, independently of c.
The (constructive) proof of Theorem 2 relies upon this problem, but it’s worth mentioning
that other hard learning problems exist and that this hard learning problem can be viewed in
two other ways:
1. The input space has two bits (the hardness bit and the “correct value” bit) and the clas-
sifiers are stochastic. Stochastic classifiers might be reasonable (for example) if the task
is inferring which of several stock “experts” are the best on average. The stock pickers
occasionally make mistakes as modeled by the stochasticity.
2. The input space consists of one real valued feature. Each bit in the binary expansion of
the real number is used by a different classifier as above.
4.1.2 Bayes and MDL are inconsistent
We now prove Theorem 2. Stage 1 and 2 do not depend on the specific choices for ph and
η, and are common to the proofs for MAP, SMP, MDL and full Bayes. In Stage 1 we show
that for some function k(m), for every value of m, with probability converging to 1, there
exists some ‘bad’ classifier c∗ = c j with 0 < j ≤ k(m) that has 0 empirical error on hard
examples, whereas the good classifier has empirical error close to its expected generalization
error. Up to sublinear terms, we find that
log k(m) = mph. (15)
The precise expression is given in (18). In Stage 2 we rewrite the log posterior odds ratio
between the good classifier c0 and c∗. Up to sublinear terms (see (26)), this ratio turns out to
be equal to
m H (eˆS(c∗)) − m H (eˆS(c0)) + mph. (16)
In Stage 3 we combine (15) and (16) to show that, with the choice ph = 2μ′, η = 0, the pos-
terior on c∗ becomes exponentially larger than the posterior on c0, from which inconsistency
of MAP, SMP and MDL readily follows. In Stage 4, we show that with the choice ph = 2μ,
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η = ν/(1 − 2μ), the posterior on c∗ still becomes exponentially larger than the posterior on
c0, but now additionally, the classification performance of the Bayesian classifier (a mixture
that puts nearly all its weight on bad classifiers), cannot exceed that of c∗.
Stage 1. Let mh denote the number of hard examples generated within a sample S of size m.
Let eˆS,h(c) be the number of mistakes that the classifier c makes on the subset Sh of S of hard
examples, divided by mh = |Sh|. Let k be a positive integer and Ck = {c j ∈ C : 1 ≤ j ≤ k}.
For all  > 0 and m ≥ 0, we have:
Pr
S∼Dm
(∀c ∈ Ck : eˆS,h(c) > 0)
(a)= Pr
S∼Dm
(
∀c ∈ Ck : eˆS,h(c) > 0
∣
∣
∣
∣
mh
m
> ph + 
)
Pr
S∼Dm
(
mh
m
> ph + 
)
+ Pr
S∼Dm
(
∀c ∈ Ck : eˆS,h(c) > 0
∣
∣
∣
∣
mh
m
≤ ph + 
)
Pr
S∼Dm
(
mh
m
≤ ph + 
)
(b)≤ e−2m2 + Pr
S∼Dm
(
∀c ∈ Ck : eˆS,h(c) > 0
∣
∣
∣
∣
mh
m
≤ ph + 
)
(c)≤ e−2m2 + (1 − 2−m(ph+))k (d)≤ e−2m2 + e−k2−m(ph+) . (17)
Here (a) follows because P(a) = ∑b P(a|b)P(b). (b) follows by ∀a, P : P(a) ≤ 1 and the
Chernoff bound. (c) holds from independence and since (1 − 2−m(ph+))k is monotonic in ,
and (d) by ∀x ∈ [0, 1], k > 0 : (1 − x)k ≤ e−kx . We now set m := m−0.25 and
k = k(m) = 2m
2
m
2−m(ph+m )
. (18)
Note that, up to sublinear terms, this is equal to (15). With (18), (17) becomes
Pr
S∼Dm
(∀c ∈ Ck(m) : eˆS,h(c) > 0) ≤ 2e−2
√
m (19)
On the other hand, by the Chernoff bound we have PrS∼Dm (eˆS(c0) < eD(c0) − m) ≤ e−2
√
m
for the optimal classifier c0. Combining this with (19) using the union bound, we get that,
with Dm-probability larger than 1 − 3e−2√m , the following event holds:
∃c ∈ Ck(m) : eˆS,h(c) = 0 and eˆS(c0) ≥ eD(c0) − m . (20)
Stage 2. In this stage, we calculate, for large m, the log ratio between the posterior on some
c∗ ∈ Ck(m) with eˆS,h(c∗) = 0 and the posterior on c0. We have:
log
maxθ P(c0, θ | xm, ym)
maxθ P(c∗, θ | xm, ym) = log
maxθ P(c0)P(θ )P(ym | xm, c0, θ )
maxθ P(c∗)P(θ )P(ym | xm, c∗, θ )
= log max
θ
P(c0)P(θ )P(ym | xm, c0, θ )−log max
θ
P(c∗)P(θ )P(ym | xm, c∗, θ ). (21)
Using (4), (9) and (11), we see that, uniformly for all samples S with eˆS(c0) < 1/2, the
leftmost term is no larger than
log
(
max
θ
P(c0)P(θ )
) · (max
θ ′
P(ym | xm, c0, θ ′)
) = −m H (eˆS(c0)) + O(1). (22)
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Similarly, uniformly for all samples S with eˆS,h(c∗) = 0, eˆS(c∗) < 1/2, the rightmost term
in (21) satisfies
− log max
θ
P(c∗)P(θ )P(ym | xm, c∗, θ ) ≤ − log P(c∗) + m H (eˆS(c∗)) + O(1), (23)
where the constant in the O-notation does not depend on c∗. Using condition (8) on prior
P(c∗) and using c∗ ∈ Ck(m), we find:
− log P(c∗) = log 1
P(c∗) ≤ log k(m) + o(log k(m)), (24)
where log k(m) = log 2√m + mph + m0.75, so that
log
1
P(c∗) ≤ mph + o(m) (25)
which implies that (23), is no larger than mph + m H (eˆS(c∗)) + o(m). Thus, for all large m,
the difference between the leftmost term and the rightmost term in (21) satisfies
log
maxθ P(c0, θ | xm, ym)
maxθ P(c∗, θ | xm, ym) ≤ −m H (eˆS(c0)) + mph + m H (eˆS(c
∗)) + o(m), (26)
as long as eˆS(c0) and eˆS(c∗) are both less than 0.5.
Stage 3(a). (MAP) Recall that, for the MAP result, we set η := 0 and ph := 2μ′. Let us
assume that the large probability event (20) holds. This will allow us to replace the two ‘em-
pirical entropies’ in (26), which are random variables, by corresponding ordinary entropies,
which are constants. By (20), eˆS,h(c∗) = 0, so that we have (since η = 0) that eˆS(c∗) = 0
and then also H (eˆS(c∗)) = 0. Because H (μ) is continuously differentiable in a small enough
neighborhood around μ, by (20) we also have, for some constant K ,
H (eˆS(c0)) ≥ H (eD(c0)) − K m + O(1) = H (μ) + O(m−1/2).
Plugging these expressions for H (eˆS(c∗)) and H (eˆS(c0)) into (26), and using the fact that we
set ph = 2μ′, we see that, as long as μ′ < H (μ)/2, there exists a c > 0 such that for all large
m, (26), and hence (21) is smaller than −cm. Thus, (21) is less than 0 for large m, implying
that then eD(cMAP(P,S)) = μ′. We derived all this from (20) which holds with probability ≥
1 − 3 exp(−2√m). Thus, for all large m, PrS∼Dm
(
eD(cMAP(P,S)) = μ′
) ≥ 1 − 3 exp(−2√m),
and the result follows.
Stage 3(b). (SMP) We are now interested in evaluating, instead of the posterior ratio (21),
the posterior ratio with the error rate parameters integrated out:
log
P(c0 | xm, ym)
P(c∗ | xm, ym) = log P(c0)P(y
m | xm, c0) − log P(c∗)P(ym | xm, c∗). (27)
By Proposition 2 in the appendix, we see that, if (20) holds, then (21) is no larger than (27)
plus an additional term of order O(log m). To see this, apply the first inequality of (54) to
Springer
Mach Learn
the term involving c0, and the second inequality of (54) to the term involving c∗. The result
now follows by exactly the same reasoning as in Stage 3(a).
Stage 3(c). (MDL) By part (1) of Proposition 2 in the appendix, the MDL procedure is equal
to SMP with the uniform prior w(θ ) ≡ 1. Thus, the MDL case is a special case of the SMP
case for which we already proved inconsistency above.
Stage 3(d). (Bayes) In order to prove the inconsistency for the full Bayesian classifier, we
construct a setup where on on hard examples, all classifiers, even the ‘good’ classifier c0,
predict c(X ) = 1 with probability 1/2, independently of the true value of Y . To this end, we
refine our learning problem by setting x0 = |1 − y| with probability 1/2 for a “hard” example,
and x0 = y with probability 1 for an “easy” example. By setting ph := 2μ, we still get that
eD(c0) = μ. In order to make the error rate for the bad classifiers c1, c2, . . . still larger than
for c0, we now set η to a value larger strictly than 0.
We let eˆS,easy(c) denote the empirical error that classifier c achieves on the easy examples
in S, i.e. the number of mistakes on the easy examples in S divided by |S| − |Sh|. Now set
m as in Stage 1 and define the events (sets of samples Sm of length m) A and B as
A = {Sm : ∃ j > 0 : |eˆS,easy(c j ) − η| > m}; B =
{
Sm :
mh
m
≥ ph + m
}
,
and let Ac and Bc be their respective complements. We have
Pr
S∼Dm
(A ∪ B) = Pr(A ∪ B |B) Pr(B) + Pr(A ∪ B |Bc) Pr(Bc) ≤ Pr(B) + Pr(A |Bc)
≤ e−2
√
m + 2e−2m(1−ph−m )2m = e−2
√
m + 2e−2
√
m(1−ph)+2m0.25
≤ 3e−(1−ph)
√
m(1 + o(1)), (28)
where the second inequality follows by applying the Chernoff bound to both terms (recall that
on easy examples, all classifiers c j with j > 1 output the same prediction for Y ). Combining
this with the result of Stage 1 using the union bound and using ph = 2μ, we get that, with
Dm-probability at least 1 − 6(1 + o(1))e−√m(1−2μ), (20) and Ac and Bc all hold at the same
time. Let us assume for now that this large probability event holds. We must then have that
some c∗ ∈ Ck(m) achieves empirical error 0 on hard examples (which occur with probability
2μ) and at least η + O(m−1/2) on easy examples (which occur with probability 1 − 2μ), so
that
eˆS(c∗) = (1 − 2μ)η + O(m−1/2) = ν + O(m−1/2), (29)
where ν = μ′ − μ. By continuity of H , we also have that H (eˆS(c∗)) = H (ν) + O(m−1/2).
Entirely analogously to the reasoning in Stage 3(a), we can now replace the empirical
entropies in the expression (26) for the log-likelihood ratio between c∗ and c0 by the corre-
sponding ordinary entropies. This gives
log
maxθ P(c0, θ | xm, ym)
maxθ P(c∗, θ | xm, ym) ≤ −m H (μ) + m2μ + m H (ν) + o(m), (30)
By definition of ν, ν = μ′ − μ satisfies −H (μ) + H (ν) + 2μ < 0, so that there exists a
c > 0 such that for all large m, (30) is smaller than −cm. Reasoning entirely analogously to
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Stage 3(b), we see that (30) still holds if we integrate out θ , rather than maximize over it:
there exists a c > 0 such that for all large m,
log
P(c0 | xm, ym)
P(c∗ | xm, ym) ≤ −m H (μ) + m2μ + m H (ν) + o(m) ≤ −cm. (31)
Furthermore, by (29) and our condition on the prior, the posterior on θ given c∗ must concen-
trate on ν (even though c∗ varies with m): we must have that, for every open set A containing
ν, the posterior distribution of θ given c∗ and sample S satisfies
P(θ ∈ A |c∗, S) m→∞→ 1. (32)
We now show that (31) and (32), both of which hold with high probability, imply that the
full Bayesian classifier based on sample S errs with probability at least μ + ν = μ′:
Pr
X,Y∼D
(Y = cBAYES(P,S)(X ))
= Pr
X,Y∼D
(Y = cBAYES(P,S)(X ) |Ex. hard)ph
+ Pr
X,Y∼D
(Y = cBAYES(P,S)(X ) |Ex. easy)(1 − ph)
≥ 1
2
2μ + Pr
X,Y∼D
(Y = cBAYES(P,S)(X ) |Ex. easy)(1 − 2μ)
≥ μ + Pr
X,Y∼D
(Y = cBAYES(P,S)(X ) |Ex. easy, corrupted)(1 − 2μ)η
= μ + Pr
X,Y∼D
(Y = cBAYES(P,S)(X ) |Ex. easy, corrupted, Y = 1)(1 − 2μ)η. (33)
Here the first inequality follows by symmetry: on hard examples, Y = 1 with probability
1/2 and all classifiers independently output Y = 1 with probability 1/2. The final equality
follows again by symmetry between the case Y = 1 and Y = 0. Depending on the sample
S, the probability in the final line of (33) is either equal to 1 or to 0. It is equal to 1 if
cBAYES(P,S)(X ) = 0. By (6), a sufficient condition for this to happen is if S is such that
Ec,θ∼P(·|S)[pc,θ (Y = 1|X = x)] < 12 . (34)
This expectation can be rewritten as
∑
c∈C
∫
θ∈[0,0.5)
P(θ |c, S)P(c | S)pc,θ (Y = 1 | X = x)dθ
=
∑
c∈C
P(c | S)u(c, S, x)
= P(c0 | S)u(c0, S, x) + P(c∗ | S)u(c∗, S, x) +
∑
c ∈{c0,c∗}
P(c | S)u(c, S, x), (35)
where u(c, S, x) := ∫
θ∈[0,0.5) P(θ |c, S)pc,θ (Y = 1|X = x)dθ. Note that we integrate here
over [0, 0.5), reflecting the extra condition (10) that we required for the full Bayesian result.
Since the example in the final line (33) is corrupted, for the x occurring there we have that
c j (x) = 0 for j ≥ 1, so that pc j ,θ (Y = 1 | X = x) < 1/2 for all θ < 1/2. It follows that for
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this x , (35) is no greater than
P(c0 | S) + P(c∗ | S)u(c∗, S, x) +
∑
c ∈{c0,c∗}
P(c | S) 1
2
.
By (31) and (32), for all δ > 0, for all large m this is no greater than
a(e−cm · 1 + (1 − e−cm)(ν + δ)) + (1 − a) 1
2
. (36)
for some a that may depend on m but that satisfies 0 < a < 1 for all m. Therefore, and since
ν < 1/2, (36) is less than 1/2 for all large m. But this implies (by the reasoning above (34))
that cBAYES(P,S)(x) = 0. It follows by (33) that, for large m,
Pr
X,Y∼D
(Y = cBAYES(P,S)(X )) ≥ μ + (1 − 2μ)η = μ + ν = μ′.
All this is implied under an event that holds with probability at least 1 − 6(1 +
o(1))e−
√
m(1−2μ) (see above), so that the result follows.
4.2 A consistent algorithm: Proof of Theorem 1
In order to prove the theorem, we first state the Occam’s Razor Bound classification algorithm,
based on minimizing the bound given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Occam’s Razor Bound). (Blumer et al., 1987) For all priors P on a countable
set of classifiers C, for all distributions D, with probability 1 − δ:
∀c : eD(c) ≤ eˆS(c) +
√
ln 1P(c) + ln 1δ
2m
.
The algorithm stated here is in a suboptimal form, which is good enough for our purposes
(see (McAllester, 1999) for more sophisticated versions):
cORB(P,S) := arg min
c∈C
⎧
⎨
⎩
eˆS(c) +
√
ln 1P(c) + ln m
2m
⎫
⎬
⎭
.
Proof of Theorem 1: Set δm := 1/m. It is easy to see that
min
c∈C
eD(c) +
√
ln 1P(c) + ln m
2m
is achieved for at least one c ∈ C = {c0, c1, . . .}. Among all c j ∈ C achieving the minimum,
let c˜m be the one with smallest index j . By the Chernoff bound, we have with probability at
least 1 − δm = 1 − 1/m,
eD(c˜m) ≥ eˆS(c˜m) −
√
ln(1/δm)
2m
= eˆS(c˜m) −
√
ln m
2m
, (37)
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whereas by Theorem 4, with probability at least 1 − δm = 1 − 1/m,
eD(cORB(P,S)) ≤ min
c∈C
eˆS(c) +
√
− ln P(c) + ln m
2m
≤ eˆS(c˜m) +
√
− ln P(c˜m) + ln m
2m
.
Combining this with (37) using the union bound, we find that
eD(cORB(P,S)) ≤ eD(c˜m) +
√
− ln P(c˜m) + ln m
2m
+
√
ln m
2m
,
with probability at least 1 − 2/m. The theorem follows upon noting that the right-hand side
of this expression converges to infc∈C eD(c) with increasing m.
4.3 Proof of Corollary 1
The corollary relies on Theorem 1 and a slight generalization of the proof of Theorem 2.
For Theorem 1 pick K < 0.05. In Theorem 2 choose μ = 1/5, μ′ = 1/5 + .15. Now part
1 follows. For part 2, consider Theorem 2 with the same μ and μ′. From the theorem we
see that for the learning problem for which (13) holds, c0 is the optimal classifier. Denote
this learning problem by D0. We define D j as the learning problem (distribution) in the
proof (see Section 4.1.1), but with the role of x0 and x j interchanged. As a result, c j will be
the ‘good’ classifier with error rate μ and c0 will be one of the bad classifiers with rate μ′.
Then the good classifier and one of the bad classifiers will have a different prior probability,
but otherwise nothing changes. Since the proof of Theorem 2 does not depend on the prior
probability of the good classifier—it can be as large or small as we like as long as it is greater
than 0 –, the proof goes through unchanged, and for all learning problems D j , (13) will
hold.
We now generate a learning problem D j by first sampling a classifier c j according to
P(c), and then generating data according to D j . Then, no matter what c j we chose, it will
be the optimal (‘good’) classifier, and, as we just showed, (13) will hold. Theorem 1 (with
K < 0.05) can now be applied with D = D j , and the result follows.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Without loss of generality assume that c0 achieves minc∈C eD(c). Consider both the 0/1-loss
and the log loss of sequentially predicting with the Bayes predictive distribution P(Yi = ·|
Xi = ·, Si−1) given by P(yi | xi , Si−1) = Ec,θ∼P(·|Si−1) pc,θ (yi |xi ). Every time i ∈ {1, . . . , m}
that the Bayes classifier based on Si−1 classifies yi incorrectly, P(yi | xi , Si−1) must be ≤ 1/2
so that − log P(yi | xi , Si−1) ≥ 1. Therefore, if for some α > 0, eˆS(c0) < 0.5 − α, then
m
∑
i=1
− log P(yi | xi , Si−1) ≥
m
∑
i=1
|yi − cBAYES(P,Si−1)(xi )|. (38)
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On the other hand we have
m
∑
i=1
− log P(yi | xi , Si−1) = − log
m
∏
i=1
P(yi | xi , xi−1, yi−1)
= − log
m
∏
i=1
P(yi | xm, yi−1)
= − log
m
∏
i=1
P(yi |xm)
P(yi−1|xm)
= − log P(ym | xm)
= − log
∑
j=0,1,2...
P(ym | xm, c j )P(c j )
(a)≤ − log P(ym | xm, c0) − log P(c0)
(b)≤ m H (eˆS(c0)) + O(log m),
(39)
where the constant in the O(log m) term may depend on α. Here inequality (a) follows because
a sum is larger than each of its terms, and (b) follows by Proposition 2 in the appendix. By the
Chernoff bound, for all small enough  > 0, with probability larger than 1 − 2 exp(−2m2),
we have |eˆS(c0) − eD(c0)| < . We now set m = m−0.25. Using the fact that H (μ) in (39)
is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of μ and μ < 1/2, it follows that with
probability larger than 1 − 2 exp(−2√m), for all large m,
m
∑
i=1
− log P(yi | xi , Si−1) ≤ m H (eD(c0)) + K m0.75 + O(log m), (40)
where K is a constant not depending on m. Combining (40) with (38) we find that with prob-
ability ≥ 1 − 2 exp(−2√m), ∑mi=1 |yi − cBAYES(P,Si−1)(xi )| ≤ m H (eD(c0)) + o(m), which is
what we had to prove.
5 Technical discussion
5.1 Variations of Theorem 2 and dependency on the prior
Prior on classifiers. The requirement (8) that − log P(ck) ≥ log k + o(log k) is needed to
obtain (25), which is the key inequality in the proof of Theorem 2. If P(ck) decreases at
polynomial rate, but at a degree d larger than one, i.e. if
− log P(ck) = d log k + o(log k), (41)
then a variation of Theorem 2 still applies but the maximum possible discrepancies between
μ and μ′ become much smaller: essentially, if we require μ ≤ μ′ < 12d H (μ) rather than
μ ≤ μ′ < 12 H (μ) as in Theorem 2, then the argument works for all priors satisfying (41).
Since the derivative d H (μ)/dμ → ∞ as μ ↓ 0, by setting μ close enough to 0 it is possible
to obtain inconsistency for any fixed polynomial degree of decrease d . However, the higher
d , the smaller μ = infc∈C eD(c) must be to get any inconsistency with this argument.
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Prior on error rates. Condition (9) on the prior on the error rates is satisfied for most rea-
sonable priors. Some approaches to applying MDL to classification problems amount to
assuming priors of the form p(θ∗) = 1 for a single θ∗ ∈ [0, 1] (Section 7). In that case, we
can still prove a version of Theorem 2, but the maximum discrepancy between μ and μ′ may
now be either larger or smaller than H (μ)/2 − μ, depending on the choice of θ∗.
5.2 Properties of the transformation from classifiers to distributions
Optimality and Reliability. Assume that the conditional distribution of y given x according
to the ‘true’ underlying distribution D is defined for all x ∈ X , and let pD(y|x) denote its
mass function. Define 	(pc,θ ) as the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (Cover & Thomas,
1991) between pc,θ and the ‘true’ conditional distribution pD:
	(pc,θ ) := KL(pD‖pc,θ ) = E(x,y)∼D[− log pc,θ (y|x) + log pD(y|x)],
and note that for each fixed c, minθ∈[0,1] 	(pc,θ ) is uniquely achieved for θ = eD(c) (this
follows by differentiation) and satisfies
min
θ
	(pc,θ ) = 	(pc,eD (c)) = H (eD(c)) − K D, (42)
where K D = E[− log pD(y|x)] does not depend on c or θ , and H (μ) is the binary entropy.
Proposition 1. Let C be any set of classifiers, and let c∗ ∈ C achieve minc∈C eD(c) = eD(c∗).
1. If eD(c∗) < 1/2, then
min
c,θ
	(pc,θ ) is uniquely achieved for (c, θ ) = (c∗, eD(c∗)).
2. minc,θ 	(pc,θ ) = 0 iff pc∗,eD (c∗) is ‘true’, i.e. if ∀x, y : pc∗,eD (c∗)(y|x) = pD(y|x).
Proof: Property 1 follows from (42) and the fact that H (μ) is monotonically increasing for
μ < 1/2. Property 2 follows directly from the information inequality (Cover & Thomas,
1991), using the fact that we assume pD(y|x) to be well-defined for all x , which implies that
X has a density pD(x) with pD(x) > 0 for all x . 
Proposition 1 implies that the transformation is a good candidate for turning classifiers into
probability distributions.
Namely, let P = {pα : α ∈ A} be a set of i.i.d. distributions indexed by parameter set A
and let P(α) be a prior on A. By the law of large numbers, for each α ∈ A, −m−1 log pα(ym |
xm)P(α) − K D → KL(pD‖pα). By Bayes rule, this implies that if the class P is ‘small’
enough so that the law of large numbers holds uniformly for all pα ∈ P , then for all  > 0, the
Bayesian posterior will concentrate, with probability 1, on the set of distributions inP within 
of the p∗ ∈ P minimizing KL-divergence to D. In this case, if C is ‘simple’ enough so that the
correspondingP = {pc,θ : c ∈ C, θ ∈ [0, 1]} admits uniform convergence (Gru¨nwald, 1998),
then the Bayesian posterior asymptotically concentrates on the pc∗,θ∗ ∈ P = {pc,θ } closest
to D in KL-divergence. By Proposition 1, this pc∗,θ∗ corresponds to the c∗ ∈ C with smallest
generalization error rate eD(c∗) (pc∗,θ∗ is optimal for 0/1-loss), and for the θ∗ ∈ [0, 1] with
θ∗ = eD(c∗) (pc∗,θ∗ gives a reliable impression of its prediction quality). This convergence
to an optimal and reliable pc∗,θ∗ will happen if, for example, C has finite VC-dimension
(Gru¨nwald, 1998). We can only get trouble as in Theorem 2 if we allow C to be of infinite
VC-dimension.
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Analogy to Regression. In ordinary (real-valued) regression, Y = R, and one tries to learn
a function f ∈ F from the data. Here F is a set of candidate functions X → Y . In order
to apply Bayesian inference to this problem, one assumes a probability model P expressing
Y = f (X ) + Z , where Z is independent noise with mean 0 and variance σ 2. P then consists
of conditional density functions p f,σ 2 , one for each f ∈ F and σ 2 > 0. It is well known
that if one assumes Z to be normally distributed independently of X , then the p f,σ 2 become
Gaussian densities and the log likelihood becomes a linear function of the mean squared
error (Rissanen, 1989):
− ln p f,σ 2 (yn | xn) = βσ
n
∑
i=1
(yi − f (xi ))2 + n ln Z (βσ ). (43)
where we wrote βσ = 1/2σ 2 and Z (β) =
∫
y∈Y exp(−βy2)dy. Because least squares is an
intuitive, mathematically well-behaved and easy to perform procedure, it is often assumed
in Bayesian regression that the noise is normally distributed—even in cases where in reality,
it is not (Gru¨nwald, 1998; Kleijn & van der Vaart, 2004).
Completely analogously to the Gaussian case, the transformation used in this paper maps
classifiers c and noise rates θ to distributions pc,θ so that the log likelihood becomes a linear
function of the 0/1-error, since it can be written as:
− ln pc,θ (yn | xn) = βθ
n
∑
i=1
|yi − c(xi )| + n ln Z (βθ ). (44)
where we wrote βθ = ln(1 − θ ) − ln θ and Z (β) =
∑
y∈Y exp(−βy) (Gru¨nwald, 1998; Meir
& Merhav, 1995). Indeed, the models {pc,θ } are a special case of logistic regression models,
which we now define:
Logistic regression interpretation. let C be a set of functions X → Y , where Y ⊆ R (Y does
not need to be binary-valued). The corresponding logistic regression model is the set of
conditional distributions {pc,β : c ∈ C; β ∈ R} of the form
pc,β (y = x | x) := e
−β|y−c(x)|
1 + e−β (45)
This is the standard construction used to convert classifiers with real-valued output such as
support vector machines and neural networks into conditional distributions (Jordan, 1995;
Tipping, 2001), so that Bayesian inference can be applied. By setting C to be a set of {0, 1}-
valued classifiers, and substituting β = ln(1 − θ ) − ln θ as in (44), we see that the construc-
tion is a special case of the logistic regression transformation (45). It may seem that (45) does
not treat y = 1 and y = 0 on equal footing, but this is not so: we can alternatively define a
symmetric version of (45) by defining, for each c ∈ C, a corresponding c′ : X → {−1, 1},
c′(x) := 2c(x) − 1. Then we can set
pc,β (1 | x) := e
βc(x)
eβc(x) + e−βc(x) ; pc,β (−1 | x) :=
e−βc(x)
eβc(x) + e−βc(x) . (46)
By setting β = 2β ′ we see that pc,β as in (45) is identical to pc,β ′ as in (46), so that the two
models really coincide.
6 Interpretation from a Bayesian perspective
We already addressed several questions concerning the relevance of our result directly below
Corollary 1. Here we provide a more in-depth analysis from a Bayesian point of view.
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6.1 Bayesian consistency
It is well-known that Bayesian inference is strongly consistent under very broad conditions
(Doob, 1949; Blackwell & Dubins, 1962); see also (Barron, 1985). Such Bayesian consistency
results take on a particularly strong form if the set of distributions under consideration is
countable. In our setting we can achieve this by adopting a discrete prior satisfying (11).
In that case, the celebrated (Doob, 1949) consistency theorem4 says the following for our
setting. Let C be countable and suppose D is such that, for some c∗ ∈ C and θ∗ ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q,
pc∗,θ∗ is equal to pD , the true distribution/mass function of y given x . Then with D-probability
1, the Bayesian posterior concentrates on c∗: limm→∞ P(c∗ | Sm) = 1.
Consider now the learning problem underlying Theorem 2 as described in Section 4.1.
Since c0 achieves minc∈C eD(c), it follows by part 1 of Proposition 1 that minc,θ 	(pc,θ ) =
	(pc0,eD (c0)). If 	(pc0,eD (c0)) were 0, then by part 2 of Proposition 1, Doob’s theorem would
apply, and we would have P(c0 | Sm) → 1. Theorem 2 states that this does not happen. It
follows that the premise 	(pc0,eD (c0)) = 0 must be false. But since 	(pc,θ ) is minimized for
(c0, eD(c0)), the Proposition implies that for no c ∈ C and no θ ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, pc,θ is equal
to pD(·|·)—in statistical terms, the modelP = {pc,θ : c ∈ C, θ ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q} is misspecified.
Thus, the result can be interpreted in two ways:
1. ‘ordinary’ Bayesian inference can be inconsistent under misspecification: We exhibit a
simple logistic regression model P and a true distribution D such that, with probability
1, the Bayesian posterior does not converge to the distribution pc0,eD (c0) ∈ P that mini-
mizes, among all p ∈ P , the KL-divergence to D (equivalently, pc0,eD (c0) minimizes the
D-expected log loss among all distributions in P). Thus, the posterior does not converge
to the optimal pc0,eD (c0) even though pc0,eD (c0) has substantial prior mass and is partially
correct in the sense that c0, the Bayes optimal classifier relative to pc0,eD (c0), has true error
rate eD(c0), which is the same true error rate that it would have if pc0,eD (c0) were ‘true’.
2. ‘pragmatic’ Bayesian inference for classification can be suboptimal: a standard way to
turn classifiers into distributions so as to make application of Bayesian inference possible
may give rise to suboptimal performance.
6.2 Two types of misspecification
pc0,eD (c0) can be misspecified in two different ways. To see this, note that pc0,eD (c0) expresses
that
y = c0(x) xor z, (47)
where z is a noise bit generated independently of x . This statement may be wrong under
distribution D either because (a) c0 is not the Bayes optimal classifier according to D; or (b)
c0 is Bayes optimal, but z is dependent on x under D. Let us consider both of them in more
detail.
(a) no Bayes optimal classifier in C. The way we defined the learning problem D used in the
proof of Theorem 2 (Section 4.1) is an example of this case.
This type of misspecification is subtle, because if we consider the optimal c0 in isola-
tion, ignoring the features Xi which do not influence the prediction made by c0, then the
conditional distribution P(Y = 1 |c0(X ), θ∗) becomes correct after all, in the sense that
4 In particular, see Eq. (3.6) in Doob (1949) combined with the remark at the end of Section 3 of Doob’s paper.
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it is identical to the true conditional probability. That is: for all x0 ∈ {0, 1}, we have
pc0,eD (c0)(Y = 1 | X0 = x0) = PrX,Y∼D(Y = 1 |c0(X ) = x0, X0 = x0),
so pc0,eD (c0)(· | X0 = x0) is ‘true’. This may imply that the set of distributions correspond-
ing to C is well-specified, since c0 only ‘listens’ to feature X0. Yet still, misspecification
occurs because for some x ∈ {0, 1}∞,
pc0,eD (c0)(Y = 1 | X = x)= PrX,Y∼D(Y = 1 |c0(X ) = x0, X = x).
(b) C contains Bayes act, but D is heteroskedastic. It may seem that our theorem is only
applicable to misspecification of type (a). But it is easy to see that it is just as applicable
to the - arguably less serious—misspecification of type (b). Namely, in the proof of
Theorem 2 (Section 4.1), we could have equally used the following slightly modified
learning problem : step 1 and step 2 remain identical, so c1, c2, . . . are defined as before.
The optimal c0 is now defined by modifying step 3 as follows: for an easy example, we
set x0 = y. For a hard example, we set x0 = |1 − y| with probability μ/2μ′. Then the
proof of Theorem 2 holds unchanged. But now c0 is the Bayes optimal classifier relative
to D, as is easy to see.
6.3 Why is the result interesting for a Bayesian?
Here we answer several objections that a cautious Bayesian might have to this work.
6.3.1 Bayesian inference has never been designed to work under misspecification. So
why is the result relevant?
We would maintain that in practice, Bayesian inference is applied all the time under misspec-
ification in classification problems (Gru¨nwald, 1998). It is very hard to avoid misspecification
with Bayesian classification, since the modeler often has no idea about the noise-generating
process. Even though it may be known that noise is not homoskedastic, it may be practically
impossible to incorporate all ways in which the noise may depend on x into the prior.
6.3.2 It is already well-known that Bayesian inference can be inconsistent even if P is
well-specified, i.e. if it contains D (Diaconis & Freedman, 1986; Barron, 1998).
So why is this result interesting?
The (in)famous inconsistency results by Diaconis and Freedman (1986) are based on nonpara-
metric inference with uncountable sets P . It follows from Barron (1998) that their theorems
require that the true distribution D has ‘extremely small’ prior density in the following sense:
the prior mass of -Kullback-Leibler balls around D is exponentially small in 1/. Since such
priors do not allow one to compress the data, from an MDL perspective it is not at all surpris-
ing that they lead to inconsistent inference (Barron, 1998). In contrast, in our result, rather
than small prior densities we require misspecification. Since Diaconis and Freedman do not
require misspecification, in a sense, our result is weaker. On the other hand, in our setting,
the prior on the p ∈ P closest in KL divergence to the true conditional distribution pD can
be arbitrarily close to 1, whereas Diaconis and Freedman require the prior of the ‘true’ pD
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to be exponentially small in the sense explained above. In this sense, our result is stronger
than theirs.
Barron (1998) exhibits an example of Bayesian inconsistency that is closer in spirit to
ours. In his example, the prior density of KL-neighborhoods of the true D can be substantial.
Nevertheless, his example requires that P contains uncountably many distributions. It is
not possible to extend Barron’s example to a case with only countably many distributions,
since in that case, the posterior must concentrate5 on the true D by Doob’s result. Our result
shows that even in the countable case, as soon as one allows for slight misspecification, the
posterior may not converge to the best distribution in P . Indeed, by an appropriate setting
of the parameters μ and μ′ it is seen from Theorem 2 that for every  > 0, no matter how
small, we can exhibit a D with
min
c,θ
KL(pD‖pc,θ ) = 
for which Bayes is inconsistent with D-probability 1. This is interesting because even under
misspecification, Bayes is consistent under fairly broad conditions (Bunke & Milhaud, 1998;
Kleijn & van der Vaart, 2004), in the sense that the posterior concentrates on a neighborhood
of the distribution that minimizes KL-divergence to the true D. We showed that if such
conditions are violated, then consistency may fail dramatically. Thus, we feel our result is
relevant at least from the inconsistency under misspecification interpretation.
6.3.3 So how can the result co-exist with theorems establishing Bayesian consistency
under misspecification?
Such results are typically proved under either one of the following two assumptions:
1. The set of distributions P is ‘simple’, for example, finite-dimensional parametric. In such
cases, ML estimation is usually also consistent—thus, for large m the role of the prior
becomes negligible. In case P corresponds to a classification model C, this would occur
if C were finite or had finite VC-dimension for example.
2. P may be arbitrarily large or complex, but it is convex: any finite mixture of elements of
P is an element of P . An example is the family of Gaussian mixtures with an arbitrary
but finite number of components. Theorem 5.5 of Li (1997) shows that for general convex
i.i.d. families (not just Gaussian mixtures), under conditions on the priors, two-part MDL
(essentially the version of MDL that we consider here) is consistent in the sense of expected
Kullback-Leibler risk. Although we have no formal proof, Li’s result strongly suggests that
with such priors, the Bayesian MAP and full Bayesian approach will also be consistent.
Our setup violates both conditions: C has infinite VC-dimension, and the corresponding P
is not closed under taking mixtures. The latter issue is discussed further in Example 1.
6.3.4 How ‘standard’ is the conversion from classifiers to probability distributions on
which the results are based?
One may argue that the notion of ‘converting’ classifiers into probability distributions is not
always what Bayesians do in practice. For classifiers which produce real-valued output, such
as neural networks and support vector machines, the transformation coincides with the logistic
5 More precisely, the posterior mass on the set of all distributions in P that are mutually singular with D must
go to 0 with D-probability 1.
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regression transformation, which is a standard Bayesian tool; see for example (Jordan, 1995;
Platt, 1999; Tipping, 2001). But the theorems are based on classifiers with 0/1-output. With
the exception of decision trees, such classifiers have not been addressed frequently in the
Bayesian literature. Decision trees have usually been converted to conditional distributions
somewhat differently: one uses the same logistic transformation as we do, but one assumes
a different noise rate in each leaf of the decision tree (Heckerman et al., 2000); thus, the
transformation is done locally for each leaf rather than globally for the whole hypothesis.
Since the noise rate can depend on the leaf, the set of all decision trees of arbitrarily length
on a given input space X coincides with the set of all conditional distributions on X . Thus it
avoids the misspecification, and therefore the inconsistency problem, but at the cost of using
a much larger model space.
Thus, here is a potentially weak point in the analysis: we use a transformation that has
mostly been applied to real-valued classifiers, whereas here the classifiers are 0/1-valued.
Nevertheless, to get an idea of how reasonable our transformation is, we simply tested it with
three professing Bayesians. We did this in the following way: we first described the set of
classifiers C used in the learning problem, and we said that we would like to perform Bayesian
inference based on some prior over C. We then asked the Bayesian how (s)he would handle
this problem. All three Bayesians said that they would construct conditional distributions
according to the logistic transformation, just as we did. We take this as evidence that the
logistic transformation is reasonable, even for classifiers with binary outputs.
Whether the inconsistency results can be extended in a natural way to classifiers with
real-valued output such as support vector machines remains to be seen. The fact that the
Bayesian model corresponding to such neural networks will still typically be misspecified
strongly suggests (but does not prove) that similar scenarios may be constructed.
6.3.5 Is there an alternative, more sophisticated transformation that avoids
inconsistencies?
Even though the transformation we perform is standard, there may exist some other method
of transforming a set of classifiers+prior into a set of distributions+prior that avoids the
problems. There are only two obvious options which suggest themselves:
1. Avoiding misspecification. First, we can try to avoid misspecification; then by the strong
Bayesian consistency theorems referred to in Question 6.3.2, we should be guaranteed to
converge to the optimal classifier. However, as we explain below, this is often not practical.
2. Ensuring P is convex. Second, rather than using the set of transformed classifiers P ,
we could put a prior on its convex closure P (this is the set of all finite and infinite
mixture distributions that can be formed from elements of P . Note in particular that
P and P are sets of distributions defined on one outcome, not on a sample of m > 1
outcomes). Then, we can once again apply the consistency theorem for convexP referred
to in Question 6.3.3, and we should be guaranteed to converge to the optimal distribution.
Computational difficulties aside, this approach will not work, because now the distribution
we converge to may not be the distribution we are interested in, as we describe further
below.
Thus, the only two straightforward solutions to the transformation problem are either im-
practical or do not work. We discuss both of these in detail below. There may of course exist
some clever alternative method that avoids all problems, but we have no idea how it would
look like.
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1. Can we ensure consistency by avoiding misspecification? From a subjective Bayesian
perspective, one might require the learning agent to think hard enough about his or her prior
probabilities so that the set of conditional distribution P does contain D, the true state of
nature. In practice this means that one should ensure that C contains the Bayes optimal
classifier with respect to D, and that P should contain distributions in which the noise z
(Eq. (47)) can depend on the feature value x . In practical machine learning applications one
will often have no idea how the Bayes optimal classifier behaves or how the noise depends
on x . Thus, the only way to proceed seems to design a prior on all possible classifiers
and all possible noise rate functions. Now the inconsistency problem is solved, because the
(‘nonparametric’) model thus constructed is guaranteed to contain the true (conditionalized)
distribution D, so common Bayesian consistency theorems (see above) apply. However, the
cost may be enormous: the model space is now much larger and it seems that a lot more data
may be needed before a reasonable approximation of D is learned—although interestingly,
recent work by Hutter (2005) suggests that under suitable priors, reasonable approximations
may be learned quite fast. It is not clear whether or not something like this can be done in
our context.
2. Can we ensure consistency by using convex models? Suppose we first use the logistic
transformation to transform the classifiers C into a set of conditional distributions P , and we
then put a prior on its convex closure P and use Bayesian inference based on P . Now , Li’s
result (Section 6.3.3) suggests that the Bayesian posterior predictive distribution is (under
weak conditions on the prior) guaranteed to converge to the closest distribution p∗ to D
withinP , as measured in KL-divergence. However, as the following example shows, p∗ may
end up having larger generalization error (expected 0/1-loss) than the optimal classifier c∗
in the set C on which P was based. Thus, existing theorems suggest that with a prior on P ,
the Bayesian posterior will converge, but below we show that if it does converge, then it will
sometimes converge to a distribution that is suboptimal in the performance measure we are
interested in.
Example 1 (Classification error and taking mixtures). We consider the following learning
problem. There are three classifiers C = {c1, c2, c3} and three features X1, X2, X3 taking
values in {0, 1}. Each classifier simply outputs the value of the corresponding feature. The
underlying distribution D is constructed as follows. We distinguish between three ‘situations’
s1, s2, s3 (these are the values of some random variable S′ ∼ D that is not observed). To con-
struct an example (x, y), we first flip a fair coin to determine y, so y = 1 with probability
1/2. We then flip a fair three-sided coin to determine what situation we are in, so S′ = s j
with probability 1/3, for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Now if we happen to be in situation s j , we
1. Set x j = y (so c j will predict Y correctly).
2. Flip a fair coin, determine the outcome z ∈ {0, 1}, and set x j ′ = z for the two values of
j ′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} that are not equal to j .
Thus, the value of x j ′ is determined completely at random, but must be the same for both
features not equal to j . We thus have for j = 1, 2, 3:
eD(c j ) = 13 · 0 +
2
3
· 1
2
= 1
3
, (48)
KL(pD‖pc j ,eD (c)) = E(x,y)∼D[− log pc j ,eD (c j )(y|x) + log pD(y|x)]
= H (eD(c j )) − K D = H
(
1
3
)
− K D > .9 − K D. (49)
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Equation (49) follows by (42), and as in that equation, H is the binary entropy as defined
above Theorem 2, and K D is the conditional entropy of y given x according to D, which
does not depend on j .
Thus, the distribution(s) inP := {pc j ,θ | j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, θ ∈ [0, 1]} closest to the underlying
D in KL-divergence have KL divergence H ( 13 ) − K D to D.
Now consider the set of conditional distributions P defined as the convex closure of P . It
is easy to see that each element of P can be written as a three-component mixture
pα,θ := α1 pc1,θ1 + α2 pc2,θ2 + α3 p(c3, θ3),
for some vector α = (α1, α2, α3) with nonnegative entries summing to 1, and (θ1, θ2, θ3) with
nonnegative entries ≤ 1. Thus, the distribution in P that is closest to D in KL divergence is
the distribution that achieves the minimum over α and θ of the expression
KL(pD‖pα,θ ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
log
1
pα,θ (y|x)
]
− K D. (50)
This expression is uniquely minimized for some p∗ with parameters
α∗1 = α∗2 = α∗3 =
1
3
and some θ∗ ∈ [0, 1] with θ∗ = θ1 = θ2 = θ3. (51)
To see this, note that by symmetry of the problem, KL(pD‖pα,θ ) = KL(pD‖pα′,θ ′ ) where
α′ := (α2, α1, α3) and θ ′ := (θ2, θ1, θ3). Since P is closed under mixing, for any γ ∈ [0, 1],
pγ := γ pα,θ + (1 − γ )pα′,θ ′ must be in P . By strict convexity of KL divergence (Cover
& Thomas, 1991) and symmetry of the problem, KL(pD‖pγ ) is uniquely minimized for
γ = 1/2, and then pγ satisfies α1 = α2 and θ1 = θ2. In the same way one shows that the
minimizing α and θ have to satisfy α2 = α3, θ2 = θ3 and α1 = α3, θ1 = θ3, and (51) follows.
Now plugging the minimizing parameters (51) into (50) gives
KL(pD‖p∗) = min
θ∈[0,1]
KL(pD‖pα∗,θ∗ )
= min
θ
−1
2
[log(1 − θ ) + log(1 + θ ) − log 3] − K D
= 1
2
log 3 − K D < .8 − K D, (52)
which is strictly smaller than (49). Therefore, while (a) Li’s consistency result (Section 6.3.3)
for convex P suggests that both the Bayesian posterior and Bayesian MAP conditional distri-
bution will converge (in expected KL-divergence), to p∗, it turns out that, (b) the classification
error rate of the Bayes classifier cp∗ corresponding to the resulting conditional distribution
p∗ is equal to
Ex,y∼D[|y − cp∗ (x)|] =
[
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 0
]
= 1
2
,
which is worse than the optimal classification error rate that can be obtained within P: since
P ⊂ P , by (48) this error rate must be ≤ 1/3.
Springer
Mach Learn
Concluding, with D-probability 1, for large m, the error rate of the Bayes classifier based
on the Bayesian posterior relative to P will have classification error that is larger than that
of the Bayesian posterior relative to P: it is clear that by enlarging the model P to its
convex closure, rather than sometimes not converging at all, we may now converge to a
suboptimal distribution: instead of solving the problem, we merely replaced it by another
one.
6.3.6 Isn’t the example just “unnatural”?
Upon hearing our results, several people objected that our learning problem is “unnatural”.
We agree that it is unlikely that one will ever deal with such a scenario in practice. However,
this does not rule out the possibility that related phenomena do occur in more practical
settings; see (Clarke, 2004) for an example in a regression context. Part of the problem here
is of course that it is not really clear what “unnatural” means. Indeed, it is certainly not our
aim to show that “Bayesian inference is bad”. Instead, one of our main messages is that more
research is needed to determine under what types of misspecification Bayes performs well,
and under what types it does not.
7 Interpretation from an MDL perspective
We now discuss the interpretation of our result from an MDL Perspective. Similar to the
Bayesian analysis, we do this by answering objections that a cautious description length
minimizer might have to this work.
7.1.1 Why is the two-part code (7) the appropriate formula to work with? Shouldn’t we
use more advanced versions of MDL based on one-part codes?
Equation (7) has been used for classification by various authors; see, e.g., (Rissanen, 1989;
Quinlan & Rivest, 1989; Kearns et al., 1997). Gru¨nwald (1998, Chapter 5) first noted that
in this form, by using Stirling’s approximation, (7) is essentially equivalent to MAP clas-
sification based on the models pc,θ as defined in Section 2. Of course, there exist more
refined versions of MDL based on one-part rather than two-part codes (Barron, Rissa-
nen, & Yu, 1998). To apply these to classification, one somehow has to map classifiers
to probability distributions explicitly. This was already anticipated by Meir and Merhav
(1995) who used the transformation described in this paper to define one-part MDL codes.
The resulting approach is closely related to the Bayesian posterior approach cBAYES(P,S),
suggesting that a version of the inconsistency Theorem 2 still applies. Rissanen (1989)
considered mapping classifiers C to distributions {pc,θ∗ } to a single value of θ∗, e.g.,
θ∗ = 1/3. As discussed in Section 5.1, a version of Theorem 2 still applies to the resulting
distributions.
We should note that both Wallace and Patrick (1993) and Quinlan and Rivest(1989) really
use an extension of the coding scheme expressed by (7), rather than the exact formula (7)
itself: both publications deal with decision trees, and apply (7) on the level of the leaf nodes
of the decision trees. The actual codelength for the data given a decision tree becomes a
sum of expressions of the form (7), one for each leaf. This means that they are effectively
estimating error rates separately for each leaf. Since their model consists of the set of all
decision trees of arbitrary depth, they can thus essentially model almost any conditional
distribution of Y given X . This makes their approach nonparametric, and therefore, broadly
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speaking, immune to misspecification as long as data are i.i.d., and therefore immune to our
results: inconsistency can only arise if the coding scheme (7) is applied to a model that can
only present homoskedasticity, whereas the data generating distribution is heteroskedastic.
It is not clear though whether the use of nonparametric models such as decision trees always
solves the problem in practice, as we already discussed in Section 6.3.5., Question 1. As a
further (but inessential) difference, Quinlan and Rivest (1989) use one extra bit on top of
(7) for each leaf node of the decision tree. Wallace and Patrick (1993) point out that this is
unnecessary, and use more general codes based on Beta-priors, of which our code (7) is a
special case, obtained with the uniform prior (see Proposition 2 in the Appendix). As can be
seen from the proof of Theorem 2, the use of general Beta-priors in the definition of MDL
will not affect the inconsistency result.
7.1.2 Does the coding scheme for hypotheses make sense from an MDL perspective?
MDL theory prescribes the design of codes for hypothesis spaces (roughly corresponding
to priors) that minimize worst-case regret or redundancy (Barron, Rissanen, & Yu, 1998;
Gru¨nwald, 2007) of the resulting codelength of hypothesis + data. It may seem that our
coding scheme for hypotheses does not satisfy this prescription. But in fact, it does: if no
natural grouping of the hypotheses in subclasses exists (such as with Markov chains, the class
of k-th order Markov chains being a natural subclass of the class of k + 1-st order chains),
then the ‘best’, from an MDL perspective, code one can assign is a code such that the code
length of ci goes to infinity as slowly as possible with increasing index i (Gru¨nwald, 2007),
such as Rissanen’s universal code for the integers (Eq. (8)). But this is exactly the type of
codes to which our Theorem 2 applies!
Lest the reader disagree with this: according to ‘standard’ MDL theory, if P is well-
specified and countable then the coding scheme should even be asymptotically irrelevant:
any coding scheme for the hypothesis where the codelength of any P ∈ P does not de-
pend on n, will lead to asymptotically consistent MDL inference under very weak con-
ditions (Barron & Cover, 1991); see also Chapter 5, Theorem 5.1 of Gru¨nwald (2007).
Special types of codes minimizing worst-case regret are only needed to speed up up learn-
ing with small samples; for large samples, any code will do. Thus, our result shows that
if a set of classifiers C is used (corresponding to a misspecified probability model P),
then the choice of prior becomes of crucial importance, even with an infinite amount of
data.
7.1.3 It seems that MDL can already be inconsistent even if P is well-specified. So why
is the result interesting?
This question mirrors Question 6.3.2. In Section 1.2 of Wallace and Dowe (1999b), a very
simple problem is discussed for which a straightforward implementation of a two-part code
estimator behaves quite badly, even though the true distribution is contained in the model
P , and P only contains 1 continuous-valued parameter. This suggests that MDL may be
inconsistent in a setting that is much simpler than the one we discuss here. But this is not
quite the case: if the true distribution is contained in P , then any two-part code will be
asymptotically consistent, as long as the code is ‘universal’; see Theorem 15.3 in Chapter
15 of Gru¨nwald (2007). Under the definition of MDL that has generally been adopted since
Barron, Rissanen, and Yu (1998), an estimator based on a two-part code can only be called
‘MDL estimator’ if the code is universal. Thus, it may either be the case that the two-
part code defined by Wallace and Dowe (1999b) is not universal, and hence not an MDL
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code, or their two-part code must be asymptotically consistent after all. We suspect that
the latter is the case. From an MDL perspective, the interest in our example is that, under
misspecification, we can get inconsistency, even though we do use a universal two-part
code.
7.1.4 Haven’t Kearns et al. (1997) already shown that MDL is no good for
classification?
It may seem that the results are in line with the investigation of Kearns et al. (1997). This,
however, is not clear—Kearns et al. consider a scenario in which two-part code MDL for
classification shows quite bad experimental performance for large (but not infinite!) sample
sizes. However, according to Viswanathan et al. (1999), this is caused by the coding method
used to encode hypotheses. This method does not take into account the precision of parameters
involved (whereas taking the precision into account is a crucial aspect of MDL!). In the paper
(Viswanathan et al., 1999), a different coding scheme is proposed. With this coding scheme,
MML (an inference method that is related to MDL, see below) apparently behaves quite well
on the classification problem studied by Kearns et al. In contrast to Kearns’ example, in our
case (a) there is no straightforward way to improve the coding scheme; (b) MDL fails even
on an infinite sample.
7.1.5 What about MML?
The Minimum Message Length (MML) Principle (Wallace & Boulton, 1968; Comley &
Dowe, 2005; Wallace, 2005) is a method for inductive inference that is both Bayesian and
compression-based. The similarities and differences with MDL are subtle; see, for example,
Section 10.2 of Wallace (2005) or Section 17.4 of Gru¨nwald (2007), or (Wallace & Dowe,
1999a,b). An anonymous referee raised the possibility that MML may be consistent for the
combination of the learning problem and the misspecified probability model discussed in
this paper. We suspect that this is not the case, but we are not sure of this, and for the time
being, the question of whether or not MML can be inconsistent under misspecification in
classification contexts remains open. For the well-specified case, it is conjectured on page
282 of Wallace and Dowe (1999a) that only MML or closely related techniques can infer
fully-specified models with both statistical consistency and invariance under one-to-one
parameterization.
Related Work. Yamanishi (1998) and Barron (1990) proposed modifications of the two-part
MDL coding scheme so that it would be applicable for inference with respect to general
classes of predictors and loss functions, including classification with 0/1-loss as a spe-
cial case. Both Yamanishi and Barron prove the consistency (and give rates of conver-
gence) for their procedures. Similarly, McAllester’s (1999) PAC-Bayesian method can be
viewed as a modification of Bayesian inference that is provably consistent for classifica-
tion, based on sophisticated extensions of the Occam’s Razor bound, Theorem 4. These
modifications anticipate our result, since it must have been clear to the authors that with-
out the modification, MDL (and discrete Bayesian MAP) are not consistent for classi-
fication. Nevertheless, we seem to be the first to have explicitly formalized and proved
this.
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8 Conclusion and future work
We showed that some standard versions of MDL and Bayesian inference can be inconsistent
for a simple classification problem, and we extensively discussed the interpretation of this
result. As possible future work, it would be interesting to investigate
1. Whether there is a more natural learning problem, especially a more natural feature space,
with respect to which an analogue to our result still holds.
2. Whether a similar result holds for regression rather than classification problems. We
conjecture that the answer is yes, but the suboptimality will be less dramatic.
Appendix: Proposition 2 and its Proof
Proposition 2. Consider any given sample S of arbitrary size m.
1. Let c ∈ C be an arbitrary classifier and let P(θ |c) be given by the uniform prior with
P(θ |c) ≡ 1. Then
− logP(ym | xm, c) = − log
∫ 1
0
P(ym | xm, c, θ )dθ
= log(m + 1) + log
(
m
meˆS(m)
)
. (53)
so that, if the uniform prior is used, then cMDL(P,S) = cSMP.
2. Suppose that P(θ |c) satisfies (9) or (11), and that for some α > 0, eˆS(c) < 0.5 − α. Then
m H (eˆS(c)) = log 1P(ym | xm, c, eˆS(c)) ≤ log
1
P(ym | xm, c)
≤ log 1
P(ym | xm, c, eˆS(c)) + fα(m) = m H (eˆS(c)) + fα(m), (54)
where fα(m) = O(log m), and the constant in the O-term may depend on α.
Proof: We recognize the integral in (53) as being a beta-integral. Straightforward evaluation
of the integral (e.g. by partial integration) gives the result of part (1). For part (2), the
leftmost and rightmost equalities follow by straightforward rewriting. The first inequality
follows because
log
1
P(ym | xm, c) = log
1
∫
P(ym | xm, c, θ )P(θ )dθ ≥ log
1
P(ym | xm, c, eˆS(c)) ,
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since the likelihood P(ym | xm, c, θ ) is maximized at θ = eˆS(c). For the second inequality,
we first consider the case that P(θ |c) satisfies (9). Then using (53),
log
1
P(ym | xm, c) ≤ − log
∫ 0.5
0
P(ym | xm, c, θ )dθ − log γ
≤− log
∫ 1
0
P(ym | xm, c, θ )dθ+log
∫ 1
0 P(ym | xm, c, θ )dθ
∫ 0.5
0 P(ym | xm, c, θ )dθ
−log γ
= log(m + 1) + log
(
m
meˆS(m)
)
− log γ + o(1), (55)
where the constant in the o(1) depends on α. The result for P(θ ) satisfying (9) now follows
upon noting that for all s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m}, m H (s/m) ≥ log (m
s
)
. This is the case because
m H (s/m) is the number of bits needed to encode m outcomes with s ones, using a Bernoulli
distribution with parameter s/m; whereas log
(
m
s
)
is the number of bits needed to encode m
outcomes with s ones, using a Bernoulli distribution with parameter s/m, conditioned on
the relative frequency of 1s being s/m—thus, the same sequence is encoded using the same
code, but conditioned on extra information, so that equally many or less bits are needed.
Now consider the case that P(θ |c) satisfies (11). Then
P(ym | xm, c)=
∑
θ∈[0,1]∩Q
P(ym | xm, c, θ )P(θ |c) ≥ P(ym | xm, c, eˆS(c))P(eˆS(c) = θ |c)
≥ P(ym | xm, c, eˆS(c))K1m−K2 , (56)
for some constants K1 and K2. The result now follows by taking negative logarithms. 
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